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Properties of Community
Gregory S. Alexander* and Eduardo M. Peffalver*
The relationship between individuals and communities - all manner
of communities, but especially the state - is a central preoccupation
of property theory. Even though the relationship between individuals
and community stands at the conceptual center of property theory,
the theories of community underlying discussions of property are
frequently left implicit. The dominant approaches to property in
Anglophone scholarship, utilitarian and classical liberal theories,
treat communities as agglomerations of individuals. Moreover they
eschew substantive accounts of justice, favoring what Charles Taylor
has called "procedural" conceptions. In this Article, we offer an
ontological conception of community that views the individual and
community as mutually dependent. In contrast with the two competing
theories we describe, we favor a substantive conception ofjustice built
around the notion of human flourishing. Although we are reluctant to
embrace any particular label for our view, it is broadly Aristotelian in
its framework. Once we have sketched the outlines of our theory, we
will describe how our ontological theory might operate, using State
v. Shack and a prominent South African property case as our central
examples.
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between individuals and communities - all manner of
communities, but especially the state' - is a central preoccupation of property
* A. Robert Noll Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, Ithaca, NY.
** Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, Ithaca, NY.
We are deeply grateful to the following friends and colleagues, who provided
valuable comments and suggestions on prior drafts: Hanoch Dagan, Annelise Riles,
Emily Sherwin, Joe Singer, Andre van der Walt and participants in many fruitful
discussions at the Cegla Center conference on Community and Property in Tel Aviv.
I Our conception of communities is intentionally capacious, embracing the state as
well as smaller groups, including families, voluntary associations and the like. As
HeinOnline -- 10 Theoretical Inq. L. 127 2009
Theoretical Inquiries in Law
theory. Across a broad range of property thought - from utilitarian to Lockean
to Hegelian - scholars have expended enormous efforts explaining what
owners can do with their property and the extent to which the community or
the state can participate in those decisions. The mountainous literature on the
subject of regulatory takings is a testament to scholars' interest in questions
concerning the relationship between individuals and community as mediated
through property.
The nexus between theories of property and community is perhaps tightest
in Hegelian property theory, where property practically stands in the place of
the individual herself. Within such a conception, working out the contours of
an owner's rights becomes the delineation of the proper relationship between
the individual and the community around her. Although the connection is
admittedly less direct within other theoretical frameworks, discussions of
property rights, from whatever perspective, necessarily reflect ideas about
the proper domain and limits of individual and community power.
Property stands so squarely at the intersection between the individual and
community because systems of property are always the creation of some
community. As property theorists of all stripes have long recognized, "[i]n the
world of Robinson Crusoe property rights play no role. ,2 Moreover, systems
of property have as their subject matter the allocation among community
members of rights and duties with respect to resources that human beings
need in order to survive and to flourish.3 These allocative decisions are
crucially important both to individuals, owners and non-owners alike, and to
the community as a whole. Jeremy Waldron is therefore surely correct when
he says that "our interest in property is effectively an interest in the political
and economic structure of society."4 In other words, whenever we discuss
property, we are unavoidably discussing the architecture of community and
of the individual's place within it.
Even though the relationship between individuals and community stands
at the conceptual center of property theory, the normative theories of
our discussion below of human flourishing and the social matrices that are necessary
for the development of the capabilities that are necessary for human flourishing
should make clear, we emphasize the role of small groups, such as families and
friends. That said, we also emphasize that the state, which we consider to be a
community, plays an important role here as well. See Part III infra.
2 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. EcON. REV. 347, 347
(1967).
3 See JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 32 (1988) (describing the
problem of "allocation" as the central concern of property law).
4 Id. at 328.
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community underlying discussions of property are frequently left implicit.
This is particularly common in discussions of private ownership, which is
to say in most contemporary property scholarship. In such discussions, the
focus is often fixed firmly on the person of the "owner," and all others
reduced to the amorphous category of "non-owner." This way of talking
about ownership obscures the possibility that the "community" may have a
moral status that is distinct from those of neighboring owners or non-owning
individuals.
We will begin this short Article by briefly describing two approaches
to community that dominate contemporary property scholarship: law and
economics' utilitarian theory and liberal contractarianism. Our goal in
describing these theories will not be to set the table for their refutation.
Instead, we seek simply to trace the common assumptions and characteristics
that both approaches share. By and large, these theories treat communities as
agglomerations of individuals. Moreover, they eschew substantive accounts
ofjustice, favoring what Charles Taylor has called "procedural" conceptions.'
We will use these agglomerative, procedural theories of community as a
baseline with which we contrast our own.
Instead of offering critiques of each of these competing approaches, a
project that would require a much longer undertaking, we will move on in
Part II to describe our own theory of community, a theory whose premises
are radically different from the currently dominant theories. Unlike the
theories we describe in Part I, ours is based on an ontological conception of
community that views the individual and community as mutually dependent.
Also in contrast with the two dominant theories we describe, we favor
a substantive conception of justice built around the notion of human
flourishing. Although we are reluctant to embrace any particular label
for our view, it is broadly Aristotelian in its framework. It finds common
ground with theories that have gone under the names of "communitarian,"
"liberal communitarian," "republican," "civic republican," and even certain
theories that have simply called themselves "liberal."
Once we have sketched out the alternatives (agglomerative and procedural
versus ontological and substantive), we will describe how our ontological
theory might operate, using a prominent South African property case as our
central example. We do not intend to provide a full statement or a complete
defense of our ontological theory in this Article. Space limitations preclude
us from providing anything that elaborate. Rather, this short Article should
5 See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN
IDENTITY 85 (1989).
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be considered more in the nature of a prolegomenon to more extensive work
that we intend to continue to develop in the future.
I. Two CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF COMMUNITY
A. Utilitarian/Economic
Utilitarian theory, of which normative law and economics is perhaps
the most prominent contemporary exemplar, has as its ultimate aim
the maximization of aggregate welfare, understood most broadly as the
satisfaction of individual preferences. Utilitarian analysis of community is
refracted through this maximizing lens. Although theorists have approached
the deceptively simple goal of welfare maximization through a variety
of strategies, three broadly shared features of the utilitarian analysis of
community are particularly significant for our purposes: the centrality of the
individual within utilitarian calculus; the contractarian tendencies that this
methodological individualism engenders; and, finally, utilitarian discussions
of the appropriate boundaries of community.
Within normative economic theory, individual preferences are the sole
source and measure of value. Economic theories, of course, differ widely
in terms of how they go about measuring those preferences, but they all
share this fundamental focus. 6 Utilitarian theories typically have little to
say, however, about how individuals come to have the preferences they do,
generally treating their preferences as exogenous, or given, when in reality
they often respond to the very distributive questions with which economists
concern themselves. 7
The result of this constellation of commitments is to instrumentalize the
utilitarian account of community. Within utilitarian theory, community is
only valuable insofar as it contributes to the satisfaction of some individual's
preferences. Conversely, community or sociality is never, for the economic
theorist, an end in itself.
The central utilitarian question, then, is whether a particular community
or a particular model of community will enhance or diminish individual
6 See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 67-68 (1999).
7 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 136-48 (2000).
Some economic theorists do favor correcting actual preferences and replacing them
in utilitarian calculus with preferences that are idealized in some way. See, e.g.,
J.C. HARSANYI, RATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND BARGAINING EQUILIBRIUM IN GAMES AND
SOCIAL SCIENCES (1977).
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preference satisfaction. Because the individual is in the best position to
know what his preferences are and what sorts of communal attachments
will satisfy them, utilitarian theorists of community stress the importance
of permitting individuals to choose for themselves the communities into
which they will enter.8 And, once they have entered such communities, these
theories affirm for similar reasons the importance of preserving relatively
unencumbered rights of exit from them.9
Perhaps the most interesting and complex discussions of community
within utilitarian theory concern the question of what might be termed
community ecology. The landscape of options available to individuals as
they go about satisfying their preferences may have a significant impact on
aggregate welfare. Utilitarians, then, must be concerned about maintaining
the sorts of communal landscapes that will be most conducive to maximizing
individual preference satisfaction.
The most prominent example of this concern in action is in the body of
literature elaborating on and refining the Tiebout hypothesis. According
to Tiebout, when conditions permit individuals to vote among local
communities by selective entrance into or exit from those communities,
the relationship between local communities and their potential residents
comes to resemble a competitive market in which individual preferences
are more likely to be satisfied than in an alternative in which individuals
lack the ability to "vote with their feet."1" Although Tiebout was concerned
with markets for local government, the same basic argument holds for private
communities as well. A landscape in which communities must compete with
each other for membership, the argument goes, will be one in which individual
preferences are more likely to be satisfied than they would be in a communal
landscape in which they had few options from which to choose."
The consequence of this approach for utilitarian discussions of the state
is a tendency towards suspicion of state power, insofar as the state is a
8 See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN, PROPERTY AS A GUARANTOR OF LIBERTY 16 (1993);
Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519
(1982).
9 See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE
L.J. 549, 567-68 (2001).
10 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. EcON. 416
(1956); see also WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS ch.3 (2001).
11 See FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 58-59, 63; Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to
Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L.
REV. 681, 710-19 (1973); Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Communities,
61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1375, 1388-92 (1994).
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community that the individual has not chosen.' 2 Utilitarian suspicion of
state power is likely to be extremely sensitive to the state's scale and context.
Based on the Tiebout hypothesis, a utilitarian is likely to subject to a greater
degree of scrutiny demands made by large, unchosen communities that are, as
a consequence of their unchosen nature, less susceptible to the discipline of
competition.
In sum, the utilitarian conception of community is instrumental and
procedural. Community is valuable, but not intrinsically so. Rather, it
has value only insofar as it contributes to the satisfaction of individual
preferences, whatever they might be. The best way to ensure that a
community will act so as to satisfy those preferences is to maintain a
robust "market" for communities, both public and private, within which
individuals are free to enter and exit communities in accordance with their
own preferences. Where such a market is absent, or where individual choice
is impaired, utilitarian theorists believe, there is a lesser likelihood that
communities will act in ways that are welfare-maximizing.
B. Classical Liberal Contractarian
Like the utilitarian, the classical liberal contractarian conception of
community begins with the individual. The results of the classical
contractarian's analysis end up resembling in many ways the utilitarian
discussion of community. The liberal, contractarian discussion of the
relationship between individuals and the communities to which they belong
begins with the mature individual in an idealized state of maximal negative
liberty and with the total absence of involuntary communal commitments or
obligations. From this starting point, liberal contractarian theorists typically
seek to derive rules for society that preserve as much of this hypothetical
state of nature as possible, at least as to the individual's experience of liberty,
while permitting everyone to gain from the benefits of community life. They
demand that the move from this hypothetical (and idealized) situation of
isolation and freedom to one of social obligation should be either the result
of actual choice or, when an external constraint is imposed, should require
that the constraint itself be justified by the need to preserve (or enhance)
every individual's enjoyment of liberty.' 3
12 See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1076
(1980).
13 See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT bk. II, §§ 123-31 (Peter Laslett
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
[Vol. 10: 127
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Randy Barnett's libertarian political theory provides a contemporary
illustration of these moves. On the one hand, Barnett praises voluntary
associations and welcomes the substantial restrictions they often impose
on individual liberty, but he does so only to the extent that joining such
associations is in fact voluntarily. "Under conditions of unanimous consent,"
he argues, "liberty is not inconsistent with both heavy regulation and even
the prohibition of otherwise rightful conduct."14
Accordingly, like many property libertarians, he celebrates the restraints
on individual freedom assumed by those who join private residential
communities. At the same time, however, he is extremely suspicious
of the state, precisely because he views it as an unchosen community
from which exit is extremely costly. "The larger the land area," Barnett
observes, "the higher the cost of exit and thus the less meaningful is 'tacit'
consent to the jurisdiction of the lawmaking process. Most modern cities are
probably too large, but even if they are small enough, states are certainly
too large to command meaningful unanimous consent."' 5 Consequently, he
favors dramatically limiting the power of virtually all territorially defined
governments to intrude upon individual liberty. Drawing heavily on Lockean
political theory, Barnett argues that the principal purpose of government must
be limited to the protection of a constellation of negative individual liberties,
such as private property and freedom of contract, the operation of which helps
us to preserve the individual liberty present in the prepolitical state of nature. 16
From where does Barnett derive the content of these negative liberties?
From an implicit account of the human person as an uncoerced individual,
living free from the constraints of involuntary community life. It is for this
reason that Barnett, like other classical liberals, talks about the appropriate
terms on which individuals hypothetically "enter" society.'7 One can only
"enter" society, even hypothetically, if one was not already there to begin with.
Liberal contractarians understand the being who enters into society and trades
away her preexisting liberty to be a fully formed, rational and autonomous
individual. 8
14 See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 43 (2004).
15 Id.
16 Id. at 75.
17 See id. at 69-76.
18 See 2 CHARLES TAYLOR, Atomism, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES:
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 187, 187-89 (1985).
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C. Conclusion
Although these two influential accounts of community differ from each
other in important respects, they also share a number of common features.
Most importantly, within both theories, the individual stands ontologically
prior to the community. Communities are voluntary associations of
individuals pursuing "convergent" ends that are themselves independent
of the community and rooted in the individual's own preexisting goals and
desires. (The exception in this regard is the state, and precisely because the
state is not a voluntary community, it is subject to a degree of suspicion
and limitation not accorded other communities.) As a result of this basic
orientation, both approaches treat the good of the community as derivative
of the good of individuals, and therefore as fundamentally instrumental.
Finally, when they turn to exploring the relationship between individuals
and their communities, both approaches adopt what amounts to a procedural
stance. Utilitarian theories of community do not associate any substantive
ends with the maximization of utility. Instead, they focus on the freedom
with which individuals may locate, enter and exit communities and
the existence of robust competition among communities for members.
Similarly, contractarians do not posit substantive accounts of the proper
relationship between individuals and their community. Rather, relying on
actual agreements or hypothetical bargains struck in the state of nature
or some other such evaluative device, they elaborate procedural norms to
adjudicate the demands that communities may make on their members and
their members' property.
II. AN ARISTOTELIAN THEORY OF COMMUNITY
A. Human Flourishing/Human Capabilities
In contrast with the contractarian and utilitarian conceptions of community,
the social vision underlying our understanding of the demands that
communities may make on their members views membership in or belonging
to communities not as adventitious, but rather as inherent in the human
condition. At its root, this conception of community rests upon a thicker
conception of the good human life than is embraced within the procedural
accounts of community and justice that we have been describing. It builds
on the Aristotelian notion that the human being is a social and political
animal, not a self-sufficient one. It stresses the fact that although human
HeinOnline -- 10 Theoretical Inq. L. 134 2009
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beings value and strive for autonomy, dependency and interdependency are
inherent aspects of the human condition.
The Aristotelian conception of human beings as social and political
animals operates for us as part of a substantive understanding of what it
means to live a distinctively human life and to flourish in a characteristically
human way. Although a full account of what we mean by human flourishing
is beyond the scope of this Article, we shall argue that any adequate account
of human flourishing must stress two characteristics. First, human beings
develop the capacities necessary for a well-lived, and distinctly human life
only in society with, indeed, dependent upon, other human beings. To put
the point even more directly, living within a particular sort of society, a
particular web of social relationships, is a necessary condition for humans
to develop the distinctively human capacities that allow us to flourish.
The second characteristic of human flourishing to be stressed is that
human flourishing must include at least the capacity to make meaningful
choices among alternative life horizons, to discern the salient differences
among them, and to deliberate deeply about what is valuable within those
available alternative choices. This is what authentic, robust freedom must
involve. As we will argue, these two characteristics of human flourishing
are interconnected.
Before we discuss in more detail these two characteristics of human
flourishing and the relationship between human flourishing and the
obligations of community, two qualifications are in order. First, it is important
to state at the outset that to identify our conception of community as rooted
in a substantive, and broadly Aristotelian, conception of human flourishing
is not to commit ourselves to the notion that there is only one way in which
human beings can flourish. To the contrary, we believe that the patterns of
human life consistent with the pursuit of human flourishing will be richly
diverse and varied. John Finnis illustrates the point nicely:
Besides limitless diversity in ... forms of pursuit, there is diversity
in the depth, intensity and duration of commitment, in the extent to
which the pursuit of a given value is given priority in shaping of one's
life and character. One man's recognition of the value of truth may
elicit from him the response of a lifetime of austere self-discipline and
intellectual grind; another's may evoke a commitment sufficient only
to enjoy the intellectual play of a good argument; another's may carry
him no further than a disposition to grumble at the lying propaganda
on his television set . . . This diversity results not only from the
fact that truth is not the only basic value, but also from the fact that
human beings (and thus whole cultures) differ in their determination,
2009l
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enthusiasm, sobriety, far-sightedness, sensitivity, steadfastness, and all
the other modalities of response to any value.'
9
The goal is to identify a framework for describing human flourishing that, as
Martha Nussbaum puts it, "allows a great deal of latitude for diversity, but
one that also sets up some general benchmarks" for evaluating the practices
that prevail within a particular society as either conducive to or inconsistent
with the achievement of the well lived life. z°
Second, we do not intend to insert ourselves into philosophical debates
about the metaphysical foundations of human flourishing or how we come
to know what it means to flourish in a distinctively human way. The
account of flourishing we espouse is, we believe, broadly appealing and
capable of being uncoupled, at least to a degree, from these tangled
philosophical controversies. Like Nussbaum, we are confident that its
normativity is recognizable from within a diverse range of conceptions
of the good life, generating what Nussbaum, following Rawls, has termed
an "overlapping consensus."'21 Accordingly, for the purposes of this Article,
we will not wade into the thicket surrounding questions such as whether
the content of human flourishing is best understood as rooted (ultimately) in
observations about human beings' essential nature or whether instead they are
(ultimately) derived, as John Finnis and others have argued, from self-evident
truths about what is good for human beings.22
The account of human flourishing on which we build draws heavily on
the work of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. Developed in opposition
both to aggregative accounts of human well-being prominent with economic
analysis and to narrowly rights-based accounts that pay little or no attention
"to the substantive freedoms that people end up having," 23 Sen's and
Nussbaum's "capabilities" approach measures a person's well-being not by
looking at what they have, but by looking at what they are able to do.24 The
well-lived life is a life that conforms to certain objectively valuable patterns
of human existence and interaction, or what Sen calls "functionings," rather
than a life characterized merely by the possession of particular goods, the
satisfaction of particular (subjective) preferences, or even, without more, the
possession of particular negative liberties. As Sen observes,
19 See JOHN FINNis, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 85 (1980).
20 NUSSBAUM, supra note 7, at 50-55.
21 Id. at 76-77.
22 Id. at 76; FINNIS, supra note 19, at 33-42, 60-62.
23 SEN, supra note 6, at 66.
24 AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES 10-11 (1985).
[Vol. 10: 127
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[t]he concept of "functionings," which has distinctly Aristotelian roots,
reflects the various things a person may value doing or being. The
valued functionings may vary from elementary ones, such as being
adequately nourished and being free from avoidable disease, to very
complex activities or personal states, such as being able to take part
in the life of the community and having self-respect.
25
Social structures, including distributions of property rights and the definition
of the rights that go along with the ownership of property, are to be judged,
at least in part, by the degree to which they foster the participation by human
beings in these objectively valuable patterns of existence and interaction.
Nussbaum and Sen make an important distinction between the first-
order patterns that constitute well-lived human lives (functionings) and
the second-order freedom or power to choose to function in particular
ways, which they call "capabilities." As Nussbaum explains, "[a] persons's
'capability' refers to the alternative combinations of functionings that are
feasible for her to achieve."26 Although the actual achievement of certain
functionings, such as a minimal degree of social participation, are necessary
components of any plausible conception of the well-lived life, the experience
of choosing from among a number of possible valuable functionings (perhaps
even including the choice not to function in certain ways) is itself an important
functioning. 27 Accordingly, a proper concern for human autonomy leads us to
follow Nussbaum and Sen in broadening our evaluative horizons beyond mere
functionings to include the capabilities that various social matrices generate
for their members.2 8
What exactly are the capabilities we regard as crucial components of
human flourishing? Scholars have proposed lists of varying lengths which,
despite their substantial and noteworthy overlap, leave ample room for
robust debate. Nussbaum, for example, would include "having opportunities
for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction" among the
capabilities necessary for human flourishing,29 whereas the ability to make
such choices appears to be notably absent from John Finnis's corresponding
list of basic human goods.3" Finnis, on the other hand, would include "religion"
25 SEN, supra note 6, at 75.
26 NUSSBAUM, supra note 7, at 87-88.
27 Id.
28 SEN, supra note 6, at 74-76; see also Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting
Approach to Property, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 1258-63 (2005).
29 NUSSBAUM, supra note 7, at 78.
30 Compare id., with FINNIS, supra note 19, at 81-90.
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as a basic human good, whereas Nussbaum leaves it off her list.3" While
there might be ways to harmonize the various competing lists, for example
by pitching particular capabilities at differing levels of generality, we will
sidestep such controversies by focusing on four capabilities that we hope will
be relatively uncontroversial: (1) life, a good we take to include subsidiary
goods such as health and security; (2)freedom, which includes identity and
self-knowledge; (3)practical reason, which Aristotle defined as "the capacity
of deliberating well about what is good and advantageous for oneself ;32 and
(4) what Nussbaum calls "affiliation," a good that encompasses subsidiary
goods such as social participation, self-respect, and friendship.
B. Dependence and Obligation
Although they may vary in any number of respects, well-lived lives will
be marked by, among other things, the presence of these capabilities (life,
freedom, practical reason, and sociality). The crucial point that we wish
to make about these capabilities is that no individual can acquire them or
secure the resources to acquire them by herself. This is because the process
of human beings' physical development mandates our dependence on others
for a great deal of the time during which we are cultivating the necessary
capacities. This form of dependence is perhaps most clear with respect to life
and its subsidiary goods. We enter the world utterly dependent on others for
our physical survival.33 Even upon reaching adulthood, we continue to risk at
least partial physical dependence on others as we move through a dangerous
world. It is often little more than dumb luck that separates the independent
adult from the dependent one. And, as we reach the final years of our lives, the
possibility of physical dependence looms ever larger.
But the dependence of the capabilities necessary for human flourishing on
the individual's social and material context goes well beyond the physical
dependence we exhibit at the beginning and end of life. Freedom, practical
reason, sociality and their attendant functionings can meaningfully exist
only within a vital matrix of social structures and practices. Even the most
seemingly solitary and socially threatened of these capabilities, freedom,
depends upon a rich social, cultural and institutional context, for the presence
31 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 7.
32 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VI, ch. 5, at 152 (Library of Liberal Arts
1962).
33 See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS 71-74 (1999).
[Vol. 10: 127
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of which the free individual must rely on others. Charles Taylor puts the
point this way:
[W]e live in a world in which there is such a thing as public debate
about moral and political questions and other basic issues .... What
would happen to our capacity to be free agents if this debate should
die away, or if the more specialized debate among intellectuals who
attempt to define and clarify the alternatives facing us should also
cease, or if the attempts to bring the cultural of the past to life again as
well as the drives to cultural innovation were to fall off? What would
there be left to choose between? And if the atrophy went beyond a
certain point, could we speak of choice at all?
34
Maclntyre similarly discusses how we necessarily depend upon others
to develop as beings capable of engaging in practical reasoning. "We
become independent practical reasoners," he argues, "through participation
in a set of relationships to certain particular others who are able to give
us what we need. '35 From the earliest age and well into adulthood, if not
for our entire lives, we receive from and we rely on parents, teachers and
mentors and friends for lessons about planning and evaluation, causes and
consequences, self-restraint and discipline, the raw material from which the
capability of practical reason emerges. We are, in short, inevitably dependent
upon communities, both chosen and unchosen, not only for our physical
survival but also for our ability to function as free and rational agents.
Communities, including but not limited to the state, are the mediating
vehicles through which we come to acquire the resources we need to flourish
and to become fully socialized into the exercise of our capabilities. Even (or
more properly, precisely) as free, rational persons, we never cease to operate
within and depend upon the matrix of the many communities in which we
find ourselves in association. Each of our identities is inextricably connected
in some sense with others with whom we are bound as members of one or
typically more communities. Each of our identities is literally constituted
by the communities of which we are members. Asked who we are, we
inevitably talk about the communities where we were bom and raised, our
nation, our family, where we attended school, our friends, our religious
communities and clubs. Indeed, individuals and communities interpenetrate
one another so completely that they can never be fully separated.36
Viewed from the perspective of the capabilities we are discussing, the
34 TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 205.
35 MACINTYRE, supra note 33, at 99.
36 For an elaboration of this idea, see Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group
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utilitarian focus on communities as a means to satisfy preexisting preferences
and the contractarian focus on the voluntary assumption of community
life reflect impoverished understandings of the nature and importance of
community. The communities in which we find ourselves play crucial roles
in the formation of our preferences, the extent of our expectations and the
scope of our aspirations. The homeless person, accustomed to receive little
more than abuse or neglect, may come to demand little more out of life.37
Similarly, while membership in certain communities can obviously be based
upon contract or voluntary agreement, the very possibility of these voluntarily
associative relationships depends upon our prior and continuing (and typically
involuntary) participation in or exposure to communal institutions that impart
to us the information and capacities that give us the tools needed to permit us
to understand and engage in voluntary choosing to begin with.38
Beyond nurturing the individual capabilities necessary for flourishing,
communities of all varieties 39 serve another, equally important function.
Community is necessary to create and foster a certain sort of society, one
that is characterized above all by just social relations within it.n" By "just
social relations," we mean a society in which individuals can interact with
each other in a manner consistent with norms of equality, dignity, respect, and
justice as well as freedom and autonomy.41 Communities foster just relations
with societies by shaping social norms, not simply individual interests.42
Precisely because the capabilities we have described are essential to what
it means to flourish in a distinctively human way, their development is an
objective human good, something that we ought (insofar as we accept these
particular capabilities as intrinsically valuable) to promote as a good in and
of itself. Every person is equally entitled, as a matter of human dignity, to
Autonomy: Residential Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 21-28
(1989).
37 See SEN, supra note 24, at 21 ("A person who is ill-fed, undernourished, unsheltered
and ill can still be high up in the scale of happiness or desire-fulfillment if he or she
has learned to have 'realistic' desires and to take pleasure in small mercies.").
38 See TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 196-98.
39 See supra note 1.
40 See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY 1-3 passim (1997).
41 An alternative formulation for such a society is one that borrows from the South
African Constitution, which refers to "an open and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality and freedom." S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 36(1).
42 Of course, this is not to say that all communities promote just social relations. There
are many examples, past and present, of communities that do not. The point that
we are making is that communities have the capacity to do so by virtue of their
social-norm-shaping function.
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flourish. This being so, every person must be equally entitled to those things
essential for human flourishing, i.e., the capabilities that are the foundation of
flourishing and the material resources required to nurture those capabilities.
In the absence of these capabilities and supporting resources, recognition
of the entitlement to flourish is simply an empty gesture. But not every
society will be equally conducive to human flourishing. As we have pointed
out, the cultivation of the capabilities necessary for flourishing depends
upon social matrices, and the condition of those matrices varies among
societies, sometimes quite widely. If we are to avoid self-contradiction, we
should judge a society that fosters those functionings and capabilities that
are necessary for human flourishing to be better than one that is either
indifferent or (even worse) hostile to their manifestation. In Part III, we will
discuss how the obligation to foster these capabilities might be met. At this
point, it is enough to establish that the obligation exists.
Just why does a person have an obligation to others in the community to
promote the requisite capabilities? Several possible bases for this obligation
exist. It might be possible, for example, to base it on some notion of
long-term self-interest. The idea here is that communities that aid the
person's development as an autonomous moral agent depend for their
well-being on the person's helping it and that, because of her dependence
on the community, the individual's own well-being likewise depends on
her (and others') provision of that help. Without necessarily rejecting that
argument, we prefer to base the obligation on a version of Alan Gewirth's
universalizability principle.4 3 The basic idea behind that principle is that if, as
rational agents, we have rights, then in order to avoid contradicting ourselves
we must acknowledge that all persons, as rational agents in the same relevant
sense, have them. Thus, Gewirth stated, "the mutuality of human rights is
a stringent kind of symmetrical relation whereby each person has rights to
freedom and well-being against all other humans [and] every other human
also has these rights against him, so that he has correlative duties toward
them."' Gewirth termed a society based on this principle of universalizability
(or consistency) a "community of rights," and he noted that not only does
the community support the members' rights but also the members have
obligations to the community.45
Our argument is broadly similar: If an individual, as a rational moral
agent, values her own flourishing, then to avoid self-contradiction, she
43 ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY (1978).
44 Id. at 6.
45 Id. at 83.
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must appreciate the value of others as well. As we discussed earlier, each
individual's commitment to develop his or her own necessary capabilities
results from nothing more than the fact that he or she is a rational human
being. That being so, then rationality constrains each of us to acknowledge
the right of every other human being, as a rational moral agent, to develop
the same capabilities. This conclusion has certain normative consequences.
Because we value the development of the capabilities of others just as we
do our own, we are obligated, under certain circumstances, to foster their
development. Our valuing the requisite capabilities means that we recognize
that they have a special moral status and that we acknowledge that it is good
that we develop them in ourselves.46 To avoid contradicting ourselves, we
must make the same normative commitment to their development in others
just as we have committed ourselves to developing them in us.
If there is agreement that our physical survival, and our capacities
to engage in practical reasoning, to participate in the social life of the
community, and to make decisions about how to live our lives, are valuable
components of the well-lived human life, as we assume there is, then there
should also be agreement about the obligation to support and nurture the
social structures without which these human capabilities, or goods, cannot
be experienced. Moreover, if those around us have rights with respect to
specific material resources in order to develop their essential capabilities,
those social structures will include mechanisms for providing those people
with the necessary material resources, or, at the very least, with a reasonable
opportunity to acquire them.47 If we are affirm the value of these goods, and
if they can only exist within particular sorts of social contexts, then it would
seem irrational to deny that we are obligated to participate in and contribute
to the vitality of those social structures.4 8
Accordingly, viewed from the standpoint of the capabilities necessary for
human flourishing, how we participate in political and social communities
cannot just be an expression of our preexisting autonomy and rationality; it
cannot be solely a volitional act committed for instrumental reasons such
as preference satisfaction. It is also an obligation rooted in our recognition
of the objective value of the capabilities we have been discussing. In other
words, acknowledgment of our human dependence upon others, on the social
matrices that nurture the capacities that enable us to flourish, creates for us
46 See TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 194.
47 Accordingly, if they are to have much practical meaning, "general rights" accounts
of property must include a commitment to social structures along the lines we are
describing. See WALDRON, supra note 3.
48 Id. at 197.
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a moral obligation to support these matrices. Our claim, in short, is that our
(and others') dependence creates, for us (and for them), an obligation to
participate in and support the social networks and structures that enable us
to develop those human capabilities that make human flourishing possible.
But exactly to whom or what are individuals obligated, and for what? The
answers to these questions are neither straightforward nor uncontroversial.
One point that we wish to stress is that the obligation that individuals owe
to others by virtue of their inherent embeddedness in and dependence upon
communities cannot be limited by the notion of reciprocity, at least not
in any strict, first-order sense.4 9 It might be possible to express our view in
terms of some kind of second-order of reciprocity, such as an entitlement to
receive and an obligation to give, where the boundaries of both the obligation
and entitlement are based on the same standard: need. Such a standard of
obligation, however, will frequently and justifiably demand disproportionate
sacrifice from those who have more, along a number of different axes, for the
(disproportionate) benefit of those who have less.
Moreover, in practice, those to whom we are required to give will often
not be the same as those from whom we have received. There is.no way of
predicting in advance who are the persons to whom we shall be required to
give. It might be our parents, but it might be strangers from whom we have
received nothing. Even if they are the same, what we are obligated to give
is often not the same as what we received, and often the amounts will differ,
sometimes very considerably. As members of flourishing social networks, we
understand that what we give we must often give unconditionally, because
the measure of what is expected of us is the need of others rather than
what we have already received or expect to receive in the future.5 ° Why we
owe, what we owe and to whom we owe repayment cannot be calculated, at
least not solely, on the basis of some sort of first-order, quid pro quo schedule.
Indeed, such self-interested calculation will undermine the very solidarity on
which the social matrix depends.5 We owe and we pay because we have been,
and continue to be dependent, and because we are members.52
49 See MACINTYRE, supra note 33, at 100.
50 Id. at 108.
51 See Charles Taylor, Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate, in
LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 159, 165-72 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989)
(discussing the need for patriotism, or something like it, if free societies are to be
sustainable).
52 It may be useful here to distinguish between perfect and imperfect obligations. A
perfect obligation is one that is owed to specific individuals, whereas imperfect
obligations are not owed to anyone in particular. We contemplate that the obligation
to contribute to fostering the development of the capabilities is general, not specific.
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Our essential obligations, then, are to belong, to participate, and to
contribute. 53 Our inherent dependence upon community to enable us to
become independent rational beings commits us to belonging to and to
participating in communities. Many different kinds of communities foster
essential human capacities; none is entitled to a monopoly on our attention
and efforts. The important point, however, is that we cannot be indifferent
to the character of our communities, our society, or indeed our culture as a
whole. As Taylor puts it:
[S]ince the free individual can only maintain his identity within a
society/culture of a certain kind, he has to be concerned about the
shape of this society/culture as a whole. He cannot ... be concerned
purely with his individual choices and the associations formed from
such choices to the neglect of the matrix in which such choices can be
open or closed, rich or meagre. 4
It might be objected that to the extent that our theory requires that
individuals sometimes sacrifice their preferences for the sake of maintaining
the conditions in which the capabilities necessary for human flourishing
develop, it dangerously exposes individuals to the risk of effacement. 55 This
is not, however, a reason to be suspicious of demands for sacrifice or of the
notion that sacrifice may be a virtue. Instead, it is a reminder that we must
be on the alert for situations in which the same individuals or communities
are compelled to sacrifice, time and again, suggesting that they are being
singled out because of their membership in a particularly disadvantaged or
vulnerable (sub)group. A community that evinces a proper respect for all of the
dimensions of human flourishing that we have discussed would repudiate such
a state of affairs, preventing a legitimate demand of sacrifice from becoming
exploitation and the loss of self.
Specifically, the aspects of flourishing we have in mind are freedom and
It may be satisfied by contributions to the community or the state. It is because the
obligations are usually general that the state has such an important role to play in
coordinating their fulfillment.
There may be circumstances in which the obligation requires contributions of
specific assets or to specific individuals. The presence of such circumstances helps
to explain the results in the cases that we discuss in Part III, State v. Shack and
Modderklip East Squatters v. Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd. We owe this point to
Steve Munzer.
53 See TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 198.
54 Id. at 207.
55 Hanoch Dagan, Re-Imagining Takings (May 23, 2007) (unpublished manuscript),
available at papers.ssrn.consol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=990946.
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practical reason. Respect for the role of freedom in the well-lived human
life operates to prevent the community from subjugating the individual to
communal ends to such a degree that the individual's separate existence
becomes meaningless. As our previous discussion emphasized, membership
in and sacrifice for the preservation of various social matrices is justified
by the need to develop those human capacities that are essential to the very
ideal of moral autonomy that underlies the concern with effacement of the
self. In our view, far from undermining personal autonomy, communities
(and the sacrifices that maintain communities) are necessary for it to exist.
The other dimension of flourishing that works against self-effacement is
practical reason. The obligation to foster the capability of practical reason
condemns situations in which the self is so distorted by oppression that
she voluntarily assumes the servile role of serial self-sacrificer, placing in
jeopardy the well-being not only of herself but also possibly of others, such
as dependent family members.56 A commitment to the capacity to deliberate
well about what is good and advantageous for oneself, Aristotle's definition
of practical reason, obligates us to avoid placing ourselves or others in such
situations.
Il. WHAT CAN THE STATE LEGITIMATELY DEMAND
OF THE INDIVIDUAL?
Just because human flourishing depends upon social matrices, it does not
follow that the state may properly make demands upon us to foster the
development of the capabilities in others. In early societies human beings'
needs for their proper development were met by local, or face-to-face
communities. This continues to be the case today.
It is important to recognize that the state itself is a community. But it bears
emphasizing that the state is just one community among many, one that, in
light of its considerable coercive power, if allowed to expand without limit,
risks undermining human flourishing by arrogating to itself powers and
functions that have the effect of weakening or supplanting other dimensions
of the social matrices essential to the development of the human capabilities
we have been discussing. Clearly, then, there is no a priori connection
between the social dependence we have been describing and the need for,
or permissibility of, direct state action in support of human capabilities. We
56 For such a scenario, see Jean Hampton, Selflessness and the Loss of Self, in ALTRUISM
135, 135-36 (Ellen Paul Frankel et al. eds., 1993).
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certainly cannot rule out, for example, the possibility that there may once
have been a time or a place where the bonds of affection and reciprocity
between members of a tightly knit community were sufficient to ensure that
each person's entitlement to the resources and relationships necessary to
develop the capabilities requisite for human flourishing was met without the
coercive intervention of any state.
At least within the modem capitalist economy, however, a strong case
can be made that guaranteeing to individuals the necessary access to many
of the material and social prerequisites for the capabilities we are describing
is beyond the abilities of private, voluntary communities, considered either
individually or in cooperation with one another. Although a full argument to
this effect is beyond the scope of this Article, it seems beyond dispute that,
at least since the rise of modem capitalism, the uncoerced actions of private
entities have never been sufficient to supply all members of society with
access to all of the resources necessary for them to have the opportunity to
develop the capabilities necessary for human flourishing.57
If that is the case, what are the implications for the demands the state
is entitled to make on the property of its citizens? Like all animals,
human beings need access to the resources necessary for physical survival.
As even some of the most stringent of property rights libertarians have
acknowledged, the extreme need of some in the community trumps
the property rights other people hold over their surplus resources.58 In
essence, acknowledging this right to resources necessary for physical survival
constitutes an acknowledgment of the existence of an entitlement to the
assistance of others under certain circumstances, and, given the difficulty of
ensuring compliance with such obligations in the modem, depersonalized
economy, to the assistance of the state, through directly redistributive
measures, in obtaining survival resources or in fending off attempts by private
owners to prevent those in need from taking them. From the point of view of the
obligation to foster human flourishing, the state's qualification of individual
property rights in order to protect the lives of individual community members
57 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 191 (1962) ("In small
communities, public pressure can suffice [to meet the needs of the poor] even
with private charity. In the large impersonal communities that are increasingly
coming to dominate our society, it is much more difficult for it to do so.").
58 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM AND FREEDOM 98-100 (2003). But see ROBERT
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 238 (1974) ("Even to exercise his right to
determine how something he owns is to be used may require other means he must
acquire a right to, for example, food to keep him alive; he must put together, with
the cooperation of others, a feasible package.").
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makes perfect sense. 9 Similar arguments, founded in the protection of human
health or the health of future generations, can justify the state's demand
that individuals use their property in ways that do not permanently harm
the environment.
In addition, the long period of intellectual and moral training necessary
to function as practically rational beings within modem capitalist societies
points in the direction of some minimal provision for the well-being and
education of the young, irrespective of the wisdom, diligence, or luck of
their parents. Almost by definition, such an entitlement will demand that the
state implement a degree of economic redistribution and regulation, either in
cash or in kind. Those whose parents do not wish to educate their offspring
must be compelled to do so, at least to a point, and those who cannot
afford education must have that education provided to them at the expense
of others. Moreover, this redistributive educational process arguably entails
ensuring that the parents of such children have the economic resources
necessary to provide a suitable environment in which the educational effort
can take root.
Finally, some exclusive control over resources is necessary in order to
facilitate the capability of sociality.60 As many analysts, ranging from Adam
Smith to Amartya Sen, have pointed out, the precise content and quantity
of the property necessary for a viable social life will vary, both between
different societies and within the same society over time. 6' Nevertheless,
because human beings experience sociability as an imperative and not as a
choice, all societies must struggle with the challenge of providing adequate
opportunities for individuals to obtain the things they need in order to function
as social beings without at the same time undermining the necessary incentives
for productive activity. In the context of a modem post-industrial society like
our own, this observation points in the direction of a human right to a social
safety net that guarantees a substantial basket of resources. However the
details are conceived, attention to human beings' social needs pushes strongly
in the direction of a state obligation to take steps to provide substantial and
realistic opportunities for people to obtain the property required for them to
59 See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, Ila, Ilae, Q. 66, a.7 (Blackfriars trans.,
1948); FINNIS, supra note 19, at 191-92.
60 See Eduardo M. Pefialver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
1095 (2007).
61 See AMARTYA SEN, RESOURCES, VALUES, AND DEVELOPMENT 324-45 (1984); ADAM
SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS bk. V, ch. ii, pt. 2 (Everyman ed. 1991) (1776);
see also JAMES RYAN, A LIVING WAGE 126-27 (1912).
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be able to participate at some minimally acceptable level in the social life of
the community.
In short, if we accept the existence of an obligation to foster the capabilities
necessary for human flourishing, and if we understand that obligation as
extending to an obligation to share property, at least in surplus resources,
in order to enhance the abilities of others to flourish, then it follows that,
in the predictable absence of adequate voluntary transfers, the state should
be empowered and may even be obligated to step in to compel the wealthy
to share their surplus with the poor so that the latter can develop the
necessary capabilities. None of this is meant to suggest that the state's
power, even as it touches on the facilitation of the capabilities we are
discussing, is unbounded. But the limits to the state's proper domain are
supplied by the same principles that justify its action: the demands generated
by the capabilities that facilitate human flourishing - freedom, practical
rationality, and sociality, among others.
For instance, the substantive good of human freedom limits the intrusions
that the state ought to be permitted to make into the sphere of private
decision-making. Similarly, the material necessities of life are, it has been
amply demonstrated, more likely to be provided in a relatively free market
than in one subject to pervasive central planning.6" Finally, the capability
of human sociality, although it may require a degree of state support, will be
impaired by an all-encompassing state that acts arbitrarily or crowds out civil
society, as typically occurs within totalitarian states.
The appropriate boundaries of state action are the stuff of endless
argument. We do not pretend to provide definitive answers; we simply
observe that the same principles that generate demands for the infrastructure
of human flourishing, that call upon the state to foster human capabilities,
also provide a basis for resisting the totalizing claims and for limiting
the demands the state can properly make upon individuals and subsidiary
communities. Two principles are particularly worth mentioning. First, the
principle of subsidiarity - the notion that the state ought not arrogate to
itself functions that can be performed just as well, if not better, by smaller,
more intimate communities - provides meaningful limits on state power
by creating a presumption in favor of private or local solutions unless such
62 In other words, costs that result from redistribution (e.g., reduced productivity due
to high marginal taxes or demoralization) will be relevant to the specification of the
state's obligations in this regard. But it is important to understand that those costs
are subservient to the more fundamental goal of human flourishing. And it may be
that the goal of attaining a society in which human flourishing is more fully realized
justifies some tradeoffs in economic efficiency and productivity.
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solutions are demonstrably not up to the task. Second, prohibiting arbitrary
state action protects individual dignity, by requiring the state to explain its
actions on the basis of generally applicable principles.
63
To summarize, then, the dependence of human capabilities on community
and on the material resources of the community create obligations, the
satisfaction of which is not strictly a matter of reciprocity with respect to
any particular person or even the community. Because the efforts of private,
voluntary communities are not sufficient to satisfy these obligations, the
state has a vital, although not unbounded, role to play alongside private
communities in fostering the requisite human capabilities. The role of the
state, however, is restrained by the very same concerns for human flourishing
that justify the legitimate demands it may make on citizens and their property.
IV. THE COMMITMENT TO FLOURISHING IN ACTION: Two CASES
In this Part we discuss two cases to illustrate our theory and to make it more
concrete. One is a decision known to virtually every American who teaches
property law and to many non-Americans as well. The other is perhaps less
well-known, but is equally compelling, if not more so. It involves a dispute
under the property clause of South Africa's Constitution.
A. State v. Shack
The well-known case of State v. Shack64 illustrates how the reallocation of
property rights to members of small and vulnerable communities help nurture
multiple capabilities. In Shack two defendants entered private property to aid
migrant farmworkers employed and housed on the property. The defendants
worked for government-funded organizations that provided health-care and
legal services to migrant farmworkers. The owner-employer demanded that
the defendants leave his property, and they refused. The defendants were
convicted of violating the New Jersey criminal trespass statute. On appeal,
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that there was no trespass, no breach of
the right to exclude. The court said that title to land cannot include dominion
over people whom the owner allows on the land, in this case the farmworkers.
The owner's property right is not absolute and must be accommodated with
the interests of others. As the court pointed out, migrant farm workers are
63 FINNIS, supra note 19, at 270 (discussing the rule of law).
64 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971).
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a rootless and isolated community, often unaware of the opportunities that
exist for them to meet their medical, legal and other needs. As a community
they are particularly fragile, and need certain property rights to enable
them to perform their capabilities-developing function. The property right
to receive visitors to the farms where they work and live was virtually the
only effective means of providing them with access to such basic necessities
as medical care. The court's decision to provide the farm workers with
the right of access in Shack would be difficult to assess on utilitarian
grounds. On the one hand, a utilitarian might argue that aggregate utility
is enhanced by forcing the farmer to permit the farmworkers to receive
guests on his land. The actual burden on the farmer is trivial compared
to the benefits received by the farmworkrers. On the other hand, if utility
is measured by the unmodified willingness-to-pay metric favored by many
law-and-economics analysts, it seems extremely unlikely that the result of
the case is a net gain. The farm owner would almost certainly have been
willing to pay more for the right to exclude healthcare and legal services
providers than migrant farm workers would be willing to pay for the right
to receive them as visitors. Moreover, even if wealth (or utility or welfare)
might be enhanced by granting the farmworkers a limited right to control
access to the farm, it is not clear that those gains are not outweighed by
the long-run costs of qualifying an unambiguous right to exclude.6 ' The
plausibility of the utilitarian arguments on both sides of the Shack outcome,
and the technical difficulty (impossibility?) of adjudicating between them
(on utilitarian grounds), highlights a fundamental problem with utilitarian
theory.66
But even setting to the side the question of its indeterminacy, utilitarian
theory struggles in at least two other ways to make sense of the court's
decision in Shack. First, while most contemporary utilitarian theorists treat
the satisfaction of preferences as the ultimate goal of social choice, the Shack
court declines to consider preferences in reaching its decision. Indeed, it
suggests that the farmworkers' preferences for some other good, such as
more pay, would not provide a reason for permitting them to trade away their
right to determine whether to receive visitors on the farmer's land. 67 The
65 See Richard A. Epstein, How to Create - Or Destroy - Wealth in Real Property,
58 ALA. L. REV. 741, 751 (2007).
66 See J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM, FOR & AGAINST 137
(1973).
67 277 A.2d at 372 ("[T]he needs of the occupants may be so imperative and their
strength so weak, that the law will deny the occupants the power to contract away
what is deemed essential to their health, welfare, or dignity.").
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court's analysis of the objective requirements of human "dignity" (by which
it appears to mean something very close to the notion of flourishing we have
been describing) is inconsistent with utilitarianism's moral subjectivism.68
Second, and relatedly, utilitarian theory's need to reduce every human good to
a single unit of value makes it extremeiy difficult for that theory to do justice
to the multivalent nature of the conception of human flourishing that underlies
the Shack court's rejection of trade-offs between, say, wages and the right
to socialize. For the. utilitarian, everything is, ultimately, substitutable with
everything else. The problem is simply in determining the rate of exchange.
Thus, for the utilitarian, the Shack court's decision to require that the
farmworkers enjoy a right to control access (in other words, its use of an
"inalienability rule" remedy) could unproblematically be replaced with, for
example, an award of adequate monetary relief to the injured farmworkers.69
But the concept of human flourishing resists such reductive exchanges.70 If a
human being requires practical reason, sociability, and material resources to
flourish, a deficiency in, say, practical reason cannot be offset by increasing
the amount of money at his disposal. From the standpoint of the approach we
are advocating, then, the Shack court's insistence on an in-kind reallocation
of exclusion rights from the farmer to the farmworkers makes perfect sense.
The decision in Shack is even more clearly incompatible with classical
liberal contractarianism. The farm owner did not consent to allow Shack and
his colleague to enter his farm. Nor is there a plausible way in which the
farmer would receive any benefit from allowing them onto his land. Indeed,
the court's decision to require the farmer to permit the farmworkers to
receive guests on his land seems to transfer certain property rights from the
farmer to the farmworkers, a transfer for which the farmer is uncompensated.
The decision is not difficult to justify on the basis of our theory, however.
Providing the farm workers with access to information about basic legal and
healthcare services addresses at least three of the capabilities that we have
identified as necessary for the well-lived life - freedom, practical reasoning
and affiliation. The property right promotes freedom in both a positive and
a negative sense. In a positive sense, members of the community now
have the right to be visited by certain people in the only place where it is
68 See id.
69 When utilitarians have favored the creation of inalienability rules, they have
grounded them in the subjective moral sensitivities of observers, not in the objective
conceptions of moral worth at work within the Shack court's opinion. See, e.g.,
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1112-13 (1972).
70 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 7, at 62.
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feasible to meet in conditions of privacy and respect, i.e., where they live.
Concomitantly, the same property right serves freedom in the negative sense
that the farm workers are free to reject that affiliation if they so choose. The
property right they gain as a result of the court's decision does not compel
them to receive legal service providers or anyone else. It simply puts them
in the same position as the farm owner vis-i-vis certain visitors.
The decision also promotes practical reasoning. The legal service
providers were visiting the farm workers to inform them about their legal
rights. Practical reasoning, at least as Aristotle understood it, is concerned
with action. It involves critical reflection about how we plan our lives."
As practical reasoners, we deliberate about how we ought to act, given a set
of available alternatives. The property right allocated to the farm workers in
Shack directly promotes this capability. Information is a necessary condition
for practical reasoning. Specifically, deliberation about our plans of action
requires a reasonable amount of information about the range of available
alternatives. That information includes basic knowledge about one's legal
rights as they bear on a wide range of activities but especially one's work.
But exactly that sort of information is unlikely to be available, at least not
very meaningfully, to individuals in situations of social isolation, as were
the migrant farmworkers in Shack. As the court recognized, "[s]ince the
migrant workers are outside the mainstream of the communities in which
they are housed and are unaware of their rights and opportunities and of
the services available to them, they can be reached only by positive efforts
tailored to that end. 72
In addition to their isolation, migrant farmworkers are, characteristically,
uneducated, poor, politically powerless (especially at the time of the Shack
decision), and without access to legal services or ordinary sources of
information about legal rights. As a practical matter, without the services
of the sort provided them by the defendants in Shack, migrant farmworkers
simply would not be in a position to deliberate about the exercise or
non-exercise of any of their legal rights. Their practical reasoning about these
important questions would be substantially impaired in the absence of an
entitlement to receive the information provided by the defendants. Requiring
the owner-employee to grant them access strengthened the farmworkers'
community and promoted their well-being.
Affiliation was involved in Shack at both immediate and deeper levels.
At an immediate level the decision promoted affiliation by ensuring that
71 See id.
72 277 A.2d at 372-73.
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otherwise isolated farmworkers could receive in their homes (or the closest
place that they had for a home) visitors of their own choosing.73 In its
simplest form affiliation means sociability, the capacity to interact well with
others. The property right recognized in Shack directly promotes that capacity.
The farm was their home, and the home is one of the primary venues in
which socialization occurs.
At a deeper level, affiliation includes the ability "to recognize and show
concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social
interaction; [and] to be able to imagine the situation of another."74 It
is the indispensable means through which communities create just social
relations. By teaching us how to be concerned for others, how to show that
concern, and how to place ourselves in their shoes, communities inculcate in
us values of equal dignity, equality, respect and justice, as well as individual
autonomy. In the context of Shack, the entitlement to receive visitors who
provide vital services nurtured the ability of the community of migrant
farmworkers to teach these values of respect and equal dignity. The service
providers themselves served as role models, neutralizing the example of
the owner-employer, whose behavior conveyed anything but a message of
respect, equal dignity and just social relations.
Nor did the court's decision in Shack unduly intrude on the farmer's
own flourishing. The asymmetric relationship between the farmworkers,
the farmer and the farm itself mean that, from the standpoint of human
flourishing, the case did not present a zero-sum game. Enhancing the
freedom, practical reasoning and affiliation of the farmworkers did not
necessitate a concomitant reduction in the farmers' enjoyment of those same
goods. The farmer did not depend upon his right to exclude the defendants
in order to develop his own capacity for practical reason. Accordingly,
depriving him of the right to exclude did not do violence to his pursuit
of that capability even though it substantially enhanced the ability of the
farmworkers to do the same. In addition, the entry of the defendants onto
his farmland does not really force an unwanted substantive relationship on
the farmer in a way that does serious violence to the farmer's interest in
affiliation. The nature of the land on which the landowners resided, and
the farmer's relationship to it (as employer and landlord), meant that the
defendants' presence on the land had virtually no impact on the farmer's
personal affiliations apart from any (illegitimate) interest he had in keeping
73 Id. at 374 ("[T]he migrant worker must be allowed to receive visitors there of his
own choice ... ").
74 NUSSBAUM, supra note 7, at 79.
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his workers isolated and vulnerable. 75 Finally, the court's decision respected
the farmer's freedom. After all, as the court implicitly recognized, even after
its decision, the farmer retained a substantial degree of freedom with respect
to the entry of strangers onto his land. If the farmer placed an overriding value
on his privacy, he was free to protect it by not housing farmworkers on his
land.
As the foregoing makes clear, the conception of human flourishing on
which our discussion depends is an objective one. That is, unlike many
adherents of the utilitarian/economic account of community, who take
human beings' preferences as they find them, we believe those preferences
are susceptible to objective evaluation according to the degree to which they
foster the flourishing, both of their possessor and of others. For example, no
matter how powerful the farmer's desire to exclude the Shack defendants,
thereby isolating his workers, we do not view the Court's decision overriding
that desire as in any way harming the farmer or injuring his legitimate
interests in controlling access to his property. This is because any desire the
farmer had to isolate his workers was, objectively, inappropriate insofar as it
was inconsistent with those workers' entitlements to the social interactions
necessary to flourish. Indeed, far from harming the farmer, by requiring the
farmer to conform his behavior to his moral obligations, the law affirmatively
helped him to find the path towards an objectively better way to use his
land.
To summarize, the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in State v. Shack
is difficult to reconcile with classical liberal conceptions of property rights
as well as with the utilitarian methodology favored by law and economics.
The decision makes good sense, however, from the perspective of an account
of human flourishing that focuses on the capabilities of freedom, practical
reason, and affiliation. And, finally, this is true even if we consider the
situation from the point of view of the farmer's own interest in developing
those capabilities.
B. Modderklip East Squatters v. Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd.
The South African Constitution is replete with provisions that express the
commitment of the state to take an active role in fostering the ability
75 It is easy to see how different categories of land might yield different conclusions
on this score. Had the defendants, for example, been seeking access to the farmer's
home, the intrusion on his own capability to control his affiliations would have been
much greater.
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of South Africans to flourish. These provisions balance the validity of
state action that is necessary to ensure access to the resources needed for
flourishing with a protection of the subsidiary institutions, including private
property, that reflect the dignity of the individual and the limited nature of
the state's proper domain. The Constitution's property clause, for example,
begins by affirming that "[n]o one may be deprived of property except
in terms of laws of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary
deprivation of property.' ' 76 But the very same clause also incorporates an
explicit commitment to land reform and racial justice. It declares that "[t]he
state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available
resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on
an equitable basis." It further provides that "[a] person or community whose
tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory
laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament,
either to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress." The result
is a constitution that affirms both the importance of state action to promote
access to the resources necessary for human flourishing and the limits on state
action imposed by individual dignity.
The success of South Africa's attempt to realize its verbal commitment to
creating an "open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality
and freedom"77 depends heavily on its ability to cope with its enormous
housing problem. South Africa is today a country where landlessness and
homelessness are common among non-whites and where literally millions of
blacks live in the desperate poverty of informal "housing settlements" (i.e.,
squatter settlements). Without access to land and to minimally decent legal
housing, the ability of a member of South Africa's black majority to flourish
will be severely compromised. There is evidence that the South African courts
have risen to the occasion. No case better illustrates this than the widely-noted
decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court in the
case of Modderklip East Squatters v. Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd.7 8
The dispute was sparked when 400 residents of an informal settlement in
Johannesburg moved onto land that they mistakenly thought was owned by
the city. In fact, the land was privately owned by Modderklip Farm. Within
six months, the new settlement had exploded to comprise 18,000 people
living in 4,000 shacks. The owner sought to evict the occupants, relying
on the Prevention of Illegal Eviction and Unlawful Occupation of Land
76 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 25.
77 Id. § 36(1).
78 2004 (8) BCLR 821 (SCA), aff'd on other grounds, 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC).
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(PIE) Act. The lower court granted an eviction order, but the occupants
failed to vacate. In the meantime, the Modder East settlement had grown
to 40,000 inhabitants.79 An execution writ was issued, and the sheriff was
ordered to execute it. She insisted on a large payment 80 to cover the estimated
cost of employing a private firm to carry out the eviction and demolition of
the shacks. The owner was unable or unwilling to pay the sum, probably
because it exceeded the estimated value of the land. Modderklip then filed
trespassing charges against the occupants, some of whom were found guilty.
The sheriff, however, failed to take any action, treating the matter as a civil
dispute. Modderklip then sought assistance from various public bodies. The
President of South Africa referred the matter to the Department of Land
Affairs, which referred the matter to the Department of Housing, which did
not respond. In the meantime, the sheriff had increased the sum required for
eviction. Understandably frustrated, the owner once again went to court and
obtained a declaratory order forcing all of the relevant government officials
(including the National Police Commissioner) to take all necessary steps to
remove the unlawful occupants (the enforcement order).
The Supreme Court of Appeal framed the legal problem as an apparent
conflict between two duties of the state, both of which were embodied in
the South African Constitution: its duty to protect Modderklip's ownership
rights and its duty to provide the squatters with access to housing. 8 1 In the
Court's view, the state had failed to carry out either of these duties. The legal
basis for that conclusion was section 7(2) of the Constitution, which provides
that the state is under a duty to "respect, protect, promote and fulfill the rights
in the Bill of Rights." In the Court's view, by failing to provide the squatters
with adequate housing in accordance with section 26, the state had created a
situation in which those squatters were justified in taking circumstances into
their own hands, thereby failing to protect the owner's section 25 property
right. The court stated:
[I]n a material respect the state failed in its constitutional duty to
protect the rights of Modderklip: it did not provide the occupiers
with land which would have enabled Modderklip (had it been able)
to enforce the eviction order. Instead, it allowed the burden of the
occupiers need for land to fall on an individual ... 82
79 The settlement had just one water tap, and the only sanitation facilities were
rudimentary pit toilets.
80 R1.8 million (then worth approximately $275,000).
81 See Modderklip, 2004 (8) BCLR at 841.
82 Id. at 834.
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In an important way, the Court suggested, protection of the property-owner's
rights depended upon the state's provision of adequate resources to the
poorest of its citizens. Failure to protect one right, in other words, meant
failure to protect the other.
On appeal, the Constitutional Court acknowledged that the eviction
order was correct and that Modderklip was entitled to that order. But
the Court conditioned that right on the state's first providing alternative
land or housing to the squatters. It explicitly ordered the state to comply
with its constitutional obligations by providing land so that eviction could
proceed (unless, of course, the state elected to purchase or expropriate the
land). The occupants were entitled to remain on Modderklip's land until
the state provided them with alternative land. In the meantime the owner,
Modderklip, was entitled to receive from the state the compensation awarded
by the Supreme Court of Appeal.
Both the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court focused on
the state's obligations, but the decisions implicated the private landowner's
obligations as well. It seems likely that in the long run the state will
be compelled, as a practical matter, to acquire either new land or, more
likely, the land currently occupied. In the meantime, however, Modderklip's
constitutional property right will be protected through a liability rule rather
than a property rule, i.e., through damages rather than through eviction.
This qualification of Modderklip's property rights is no trivial matter. It
has been forced to continue a relationship with a contingent of squatters
that was the equivalent of a small city's population, a relationship that
doubtless it was eager to terminate. Moreover, as time goes by, the force
of the squatters' claims to remain on its land permanently will grow even
stronger, increasing the pressure on the state to expropriate the land outright,
albeit with payment of some compensation to Modderklip. The courts'
unwillingness to ratify Modderklip's desire to remove the squatters from its
land illustrates the courts' willingness to take seriously the obligations of
owners, not only as they concern owners' direct relationship with the state
but also in relation to the needs of other citizens.
This compelled sacrifice cannot be squared with classical liberal
principles. It was not voluntarily undertaken, and it is not justified as
essential to the preservation of equal (negative) liberty. Likewise, it is
difficult (although perhaps not impossible) to justify on utilitarian grounds.
Although the forced transfer of property can be justified on utilitarian
grounds,83 the utilitarian calculus seems indeterminate with respect to two
83 In the absence of externalities or high transaction costs, utilitarians generally favor
voluntary transfers of property, because individuals are in the best position to know
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features of the Modderklip decision: (1) the Court's use of a liability rule
rather than, as in the case of adverse possession, a direct transfer of the
entitlement to the squatters; and (2) the Court's decision to require the state,
rather than the squatters, to pay Modderklip for the right to remain on the
land. In contrast to these difficulties, the Modderklip result, both in its broad
outlines and in its specific details, fits very comfortably within our theory
of community and obligation.
Squatters' access to land for housing is surely a component of the
minimal material conditions for human flourishing, by almost any measure.
The capabilities of life and freedom, for example, are virtually meaningless
if someone does not have a place in which they have a legally-recognized
entitlement of residence. s4 The state therefore has an obligation to work to
provide its citizens with the opportunity to obtain such access. One crucial
way the state can do this is by providing the legal and social underpinnings for
a robust and prosperous market economy. But when a market economy is built
on distributions of resources that are themselves skewed by past injustices,
as in the case of South Africa, or when markets, as they are prone to do,
operate to the exclusion of those at the bottom of the economic ladder, the
state's intervention in the economy is justified, provided it is undertaken
non-arbitrarily and in a manner consistent with principles of subsidiarity.
Modderklip illustrates another aspect of our theory. The post-Legal Realist
conventional wisdom regarding the concept of ownership is to emphasize
ownership as a relationship among persons with respect to things and to
disparage the person-property link.85 Our theory, although not repudiating the
the value they place on a piece of property. As one of us has argued elsewhere,
however, it is not impossible to justify forced transfers of property on utilitarian
grounds when there is reason to believe that the maldistribution of wealth has
impeded the ability of parties to express their preferences through voluntary market
transactions. See Pefialver & Katyal, supra note 60, at 1145-52. But the law is
usually careful to restrict exceptions to the rule favoring voluntary transactions in
order to increase society's confidence that any particular forced transfer is actually
justified on the grounds of market failure. This is apparent, for example, in the case
of adverse possession, which imposes a number of barriers to squatting, in part as a
means of identifying those who are truly unable to express in the market the value
they place on the land and in part as a means of limiting the negative economic
effects of adverse possession to owners who do not place a high value on the land
being possessed. In this case, there is reason to think that the squatters placed a very
high value on the land they occupied, but, given Modderklip's speedy response to
the land invasion, there is no reason to think that he valued the land any less.
84 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 295 (1991).
85 On the Realist conception and criticisms of it, see JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER,
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relational insight behind the Realist conception, also acknowledges the special
relationship that can exist between persons and property. Thus, in Modderklip,
by the time the case reached the courts, the squatters were already strongly
attached to the land they occupied. It had, quite literally, become their home.
True, the same land was also Modderklip's farm, but it was not its dwelling
place, just as the land on which the migrant workers in State v. Shack lived
was not the owner-employer's dwelling place. The character of the particular
land the squatters occupied as nonfungible (to them) explains why from the
perspective of our theory, monetary redistribution (through the tax system or
some other form of transfer payment) would not have provided a satisfactory
alternative solution. The squatters' capabilities of freedom and affiliation
could not be adequately nurtured through some monetary substitute for that
land. The state could fulfill its obligation to nurture those capabilities best
by honoring the nonfungible role the land they had made their home had
come to play in their lives.
86
It is important to note that the state's obligations are not unlimited. An
unlimited and immediate obligation to provide housing to South Africa's
entire homeless population might well bankrupt the state or prevent it from
meeting other, equally fundamental obligations, a result that would do little
to promote the interest in human flourishing underlying South Africa's
constitutionally entrenched commitment to a legal right to housing.
As a large landowner, Modderklip is under an obligation to contribute
from its own property in order to assist in providing the squatters with the
ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 9-13 (2000); Hanoch Dagan, The
Craft of Property, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1517 (2003); Craig Anthony Arnold, The
Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Interests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 281 (2002); J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA
L. REV. 711 (1996); J.L. Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique
of the Disaggregation of Property, 93 MICH. L. REV. 239 (1994).
86 Although the notion of nonfungibility as we are using it bears a superficial
resemblance to that concept as discussed by Margaret Radin, Property and
Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982), we mean something substantially
different. Whereas Radin uses nonfungibility to refer to the strength of the subjective
attachment an individual exhibits towards a particular item of property, our focus
is on the role the property plays within an individual's pursuit of an objective
account of human flourishing. Of course, as a behavioral matter, these two senses
of nonfungibility will overlap to a certain extent. Moreover, Radin subsequently
modifies her commitment to individuals' subjective attachments by introducing the
notion of flourishing as a limitation on the sorts of subjective bonds society should
honor. It is clear, however, that, for her, subjective attachment remains the essence
(and sine qua non) of nonfungibility whereas, for us, attachment is, if anything,
merely a consequence of nonfungibility.
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opportunity to obtain the resources they need to flourish. However, just like
the state's obligation, Modderklip's obligation is not unlimited. After all, it
is an obligation that falls on all property owners, and therefore should not
be imposed on just one property owner.
As in Shack, the various opinions in Modderklip walk a careful path
between the respective obligations of the state and of Modderklip, as well
as the entitlements of both Modderklip and the squatters. They prohibit the
squatters from being thrown back into landlessness, but they also help spread
the costs of that decision by ordering the state to compensate Modderklip
for the loss of its land. They hold out the possibility that the landowner will
recover its land at some future point, but they also invite the state to acquire
the land through its power of eminent domain in order to give it over to the
squatters as part of the operation of South Africa's ongoing process of land
reform.
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